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ABSTRACT 
Xpedite was a computer-based information system developed by the United Network for Organ 
Sharing (UNOS) to enhance organ procurement and placement from cadavers. Using state-of-
the-art development approaches and technology at the time of its development, Xpedite was built 
around Lotus Notes®, facsimile machines, and alphanumeric pagers.  It was developed to 
integrate and streamline the collection, transfer, and exchange of data on available organs more 
fully. The concept was to shorten the time from organ availability (i.e., donor death) to transplant, 
thus reducing organ wastage.  Xpedite met design and operational performance goals (i.e., a 
reduction in placement times and data errors), yet its operation was terminated after barely 
twenty-four months of operation.  Adoption of the new technology throughout the transplant 
community was limited due to inexperience with integrated information technology systems and 
the resistance to change that accompanied Xpedite’s launch.  The individual and organizational 
resistance was a surprise to UNOS.  The technical and organizational lessons learned from this 
experience helped UNOS with developing subsequent information technology infrastructure 
components.  The complexity of the technology support environment and low levels of user 
adoption for Xpedite ultimately led to an evolution beyond this tool, resulting in an Internet-based 
environment that would be more robust, easier to maintain, and better able to support user 
needs.   
Keywords: implementation, rapid application development (RAD), resistance, power, 
organizational coupling, organ transplantation 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The real crisis in transplantation today is the critical shortage of organs available 
for transplant.  For all patients awaiting a life-saving heart, lung, liver, kidney, or 
pancreas, 10 will die – today and every day – because an organ was not 
available.  Increasing the supply of donated organs should be national policy. 
James M. Burdick, M.D. Transplant Surgeon, Johns Hopkins Medical Center, 
President UNOS Board of Directors [June 1996-June 1997] 
Among lifesaving medical procedures, organ transplantation from a cadaveric (i.e., non-living) 
donor is unique.  Like most medical procedures, organ transplantation relies upon the skills of the 
recipient’s physician, surgeon, and transplant team.  In addition, it requires the “donation” of one 
or more organs from a person who is declared legally dead (i.e., in the United States, officially 
brain dead) for transplantation in one or more recipients.  Unfortunately, because not enough 
organs are available for all who await a transplant, it is important that every available organ be 
used in these life-saving transplants. 
Organ viability for transplantation is measured in hours.   Therefore, careful and timely 
coordination is required to match and place donor organs with recipients,1 communicate essential 
medical information between donor and recipient hospitals, and recover, preserve, and transport 
organs, often over great distance, before the transplant can take place.  A breakdown in any 
element of this process can lead to the wastage of desperately needed organs and perhaps the 
death of a potential transplant recipient before a transplant can occur.   
Xpedite was a client-server information technology environment developed to facilitate and 
streamline the organ procurement, placement, and transplantation process.  It was an integrated 
system built around Lotus Notes®, SkyTel pagers, and facsimile machines [OIS, 1995; Rapid 
Transplants, 1995].  While it wasn’t expected to eliminate the organ shortage, Xpedite was 
designed to assist in better managing the procurement and placement of available organs while 
reducing organ wastage by extending information technology (IT) support across a broader range 
of transplant-related activities.  Further, it was an attempt to start the consolidation and integration 
of separately developed independent IT systems.  But the technology itself was not sufficient to 
improve the procurement and placement process.  Organizational issues, such as resistance to 
change, community interdependencies, or organizational coupling, individual and unit power, and 
organizational inertia, also need to be actively considered as contributing factors in Xpedite’s 
limited success and ultimate demise.   
This paper proceeds as follows.  First, a brief overview of the organ procurement, placement, and 
transplantation process is presented to provide a context for the organization environment and its 
IT infrastructure (Section II).  The process of analysis, design, and implementation for Xpedite is 
presented in Section III.   The problems encountered in the development and implementation of 
Xpedite and its subsequent termination are considered in Section IV.  Section V explores the 
lessons learned by the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) in continuing the development 
and integration of their IT environment. 
                                                     
1     Because up to eight organs, i.e., heart, liver, pancreas, intestines, two kidneys, and two lungs, may be 
donated, the process can be arduous.  This list does not include blood, bone marrow, corneas, or other 
body parts or components. 
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II. OVERVIEW OF ORGAN PROCUREMENT AND PLACEMENT: UNOS – THE UNITED 
NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING 
The United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) coordinates the allocation of organs from 
cadaveric donors throughout the United States [UNOS, 1994].  It is a private, nonprofit 
corporation, formed in 1986 following the passage of The National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA), 
P.L. 98-507 in 1984.  UNOS operates the national Organ Procurement and Transplantation 
Network (OPTN) under contract with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.  As 
administrator of the OPTN, UNOS maintains a computerized waiting list of all people awaiting an 
organ transplant in the U.S. and assists in the development of national guidelines for organ 
allocation.  Under a separate contract, UNOS also maintains the Scientific Registry of Transplant 
Recipients.  This registry consists of data on all U.S. transplants and tracking information on all 
transplant recipients as long as they survive with a functioning transplanted organ.  All transplant 
centers, organ procurement organizations, and histocompatibility2 laboratories involved in 
transplantation are members of UNOS.  At the time of Xpedite’s design and launch, UNOS 
membership stood at 4433 [UNOS, 1997].   
In summary, UNOS’s two fundamental missions are: 
1. to assist in procuring and placing organs for transplantation, and  
2. to maintain a database of transplant recipients to support research directed at 
improving organ allocation criteria and national policy and to improve the transplant 
process.   
To fulfill the requirements of its contract with the federal government, UNOS must maintain and 
continue to develop and extend the IT infrastructure to support and coordinate organ procurement 
and transplantation in the United States.  Xpedite, the project reported in this article, was 
determined to be the important next step in the IT evolution at UNOS, improving both organ 
placement and better integrating the broader IT environment. 
TRANSPLANT WAITING LIST 
With the passage of NOTA in 1984, the improvement in transplant procedures and 
immunosuppressive therapies, and the centralization and coordination of organ matching through 
UNOS, the number of transplants in the United States grew significantly in the last 20 years.  The 
number of transplants of cadaveric organs rose from 10,795 in 1988, to 15,915 in 1995 [UNOS, 
1997] to 18,653 in 2003 [UNOS, 2004].  However, during this same time frame the OPTN waiting 
list grew from 16,026 in 1988 to 50,384 (updated data for 1995 as of January 15, 1997].4,5  
Growth of the waiting list continued in subsequent years, with current registration data showing 
95,602 people on the waiting list [UNOS, 2004].  Table 1 summarizes this data.)  Some speculate 
                                                     
2 Histocompatibility is a state or condition in which the absence of immunological interference permits the 
grafting of tissue or the transfusion of blood (American Heritage Dictionary, Second College Edition, 1982). 
3 These include 281 transplant centers, 4 consortium members, 54 independent organ procurement 
organizations (OPOs), 55 independent tissue typing laboratories, 12 voluntary health organizations, 8 
general public members, and 29 medical/scientific organizations. 
 
4 Immunosuppressive therapies are combinations of drugs, including steroids, to suppress a natural immune 
response of an organism to antigens produced by a foreign body; i.e., prevent the body from “rejecting” a 
transplanted organ by immune system attack.  This attack will damage and subsequently destroy the 
transplanted organ. 
 
5 UNOS policies allow individuals awaiting an organ transplant to be listed with more than one transplant 
center (i.e., multiple listing) and for more than one organ (e.g., heart, lung, kidney). Thus, the number of 
registrations may be greater than the actual number of patients.  
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that another 50,000 to 100,000 people in the U.S. may need an organ transplant, but are never 
placed on the UNOS waiting list for a variety of medical and financial reasons [UNOS, 1997]. 
Table 1. Summary of Transplant Waiting List versus Organ Donors –  
Macro-Level Data 
      
 
 
Total No.  
of 
Potential 
Recipients 
on Waiting 
Lista 
Total No.  
of Deaths 
while 
awaiting 
Transplant 
b 
Total No.  
of Organs 
Recovered 
for 
Transplant 
Cadaveric 
Donors 
Organs 
Cadaveric 
Donors 
Living  
Donor 
Organs 
1988 16,026 1,504 13,966 12,142 4,080 1,824 
1989 19,095 1,684 14,769 12,851 4,011 1,918 
1990 21,914 1,986 17,124 15,001 4,509 2,123 
1991 24,719 2,410 18,030 15,603 4,526 2,427 
1992 29,415 2,636 18,609 16,038 4,520 2,571 
1993 33,352 3,099 21,013 18,108 4,861 2,905 
1994 37,609 3,416 22,368 19,262 5,099 3,106 
1995 43,983 3,723 23,247 19,749 5,362 3,498 
1996 50,169 4,247 23,481 19,681 5,416 3,800 
1997 55,557 4,812 24,127 20,061 5,478 4,066 
1998 62,415 5,507 25,385 20,815 5,793 4,570 
1999 68,303 6,973 26,177 21,133 5,824 5,044 
2000 75,006 6,612 27,433 21,499 5,985 5,934 
2001 80,586 7,184 28,530 21,921 6,080 6,609 
2002 82,749 7,262 29,033 22,404 6,190 6,629 
2003 Not available 7,073 29,731 22,902 6,457 6,829 
2004 92,277 7,060 32,150 25,146 7,150 7,004 
2005 c 95,602 1,598 8,152 6,505 1,881 1,647 
 
a      The data in this column was derived from Table 5, p. 24, of the 1997 Annual Report, The U.S. Scientific 
Registry of Transplant Recipients and The Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 
Transplant Data 1998-1996, UNOS and the 2004 Annual Report found at the UNOS/OPTN website at 
http://www.optn.org/AR2004/default.htm (retrieved 7/10/05). 
b The data in this column was derived from Table 7, p. 26, of the 1997 Annual Report, The U.S. Scientific 
Registry of Transplant Recipients and The Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 
Transplant Data 1998-1996, UNOS and Table 1.7 of the 2004 Annual Report found at the UNOS/OPTN 
website at http://www.optn.org/AR2004/default.htm (retrieved 7/10/05). 
c Data is for a partial year, through March 31, 2005, the most recent data currently available. 
ORGAN PROCUREMENT AND MATCH FOR TRANSPLANTATION 
Since it is illegal to buy or sell human organs for transplantation in the United States, “the gift of 
life” is a donation by the donor’s family.  Organ recipients do not “buy” the organ, although there 
are other substantial medical- and transplant-related expenses.  Instead, all potential recipients 
for an organ transplant are placed on the OPTN transplantation waiting list (i.e., a database) 
maintained by UNOS.  This waiting list is accessible 24-hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a 
year.  The criteria for being placed on the list were established through an advisory process of 
participating physicians, surgeons, medical organizations, other significant stakeholders (e.g., 
actual transplant recipients and recipient family members), and public comment [Koch, 1999; 
Pritsker, 1998; UNOS, 1999].  When a recipient’s name is added to the waiting list, their medical 
profile is entered and stored in the UNOS database.  Instead of being added to an already ranked 
list, the recipient is added to a “pool” of patient names.  The “pool” approach is used because of 
changing availability of recipients due to fluctuations in health and varying match characteristics 
due to differences in histocompatibility between donors and potential recipients; i.e., not all 
organs are suitable for all candidate recipients [Klein et al., 1994; Wall Street Journal, 2004].   
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When an organ donor becomes available (i.e., when someone is pronounced brain dead), the 
facility with the donor accesses the UNOS computer with donor information; the UNOS Match 
program generates a ranked list of patients based on the donor information.6  Rankings are 
determined by both medical and scientific criteria (i.e., UNOS policies and pre-established 
priorities), such as tissue match, blood type, age, body size, length of time on the waiting list, 
immune status, and medical urgency (for heart, liver, and intestinal organs).  The criteria are 
under constant assessment and scrutiny for modification through analysis and evaluation of the 
Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients to allocate the scarce resource (i.e., organs) better for 
transplantation.7  The location of both the donor and recipient are also important factors in 
developing the ranking [Johannes, 2004; Koch, 1999; Pritsker, 1998; UNOS, 1997]. 
Historically, an organ procurement coordinator at the donor hospital then makes a series of 
individual phone calls to several transplant centers identified through the Match system.  Detailed 
donor information is faxed to the transplant teams of the viable recipients for immediate 
assessment.  Potential recipients within the local area typically are given first priority; if no 
suitable matches are found, the search is broadened to a larger regional focus, and then 
nationwide.  Offers are made in sequence according to a priority ranking of potential recipients; 
the coordinator often must repeat the process several times for a given organ if one or more 
centers decline the offer.  Since each center may take up to one hour to respond to an offer, 
several hours may pass before an organ is placed.  Offers are also made individually for each 
organ available (e.g., kidneys, liver, pancreas, intestine, heart and/or lungs), adding to the time 
consumed by this process and requiring additional coordination of donor resources.  During this 
time, the (officially “brain dead”) donor’s vital functions are being sustained artificially to preserve 
organ viability. This process may last from a few hours to a few days.  Should artificial respiration 
and circulation end prematurely, the opportunity to recover any organ is lost. The intended 
transplant recipient may die if another donor is not found in time. 
The top person on the ranked list often will not receive the transplant.  The individual must be 
available (i.e., they can be located, contacted, and able to reach the transplant center quickly), 
healthy enough to undergo major surgery, and willing to be immediately transplanted.  The 
willingness to be transplanted immediately is important.  For many recipients a transplant can 
mean a new lease on life up to an almost normal life expectancy and active life.  Unfortunately, 
for some, a failed transplant process or poor match between the organ and recipient can mean 
almost immediate death, sometimes within hours of the surgery or even during the surgery.  
Therefore, a laboratory test is also often given to ensure compatibility between the recipient and 
the organ to be transplanted.  Once the recipient is identified, surgery is scheduled and the 
transplant takes place within hours. The procurement and placement process is shown in Figure 
1. 
ORGAN SHORTAGE 
Unfortunately, fewer organs are available than the number of people awaiting a transplant.  
Increasing the donor pool remains the single best method for eliminating the organ shortage.  
Extensive efforts have been made to increase the number of donors.  For example, advertising 
campaigns encourage people to become organ donors and to indicate their preferences to their 
families,. The appearance of organ donation as a plot device in several popular TV shows 
increased [cf. Johannes, 2004; UNOS Update, 2001].  Yet, in the mid-1990s, on average, ten 
 
                                                     
6     Since the data entry process is largely manual, it often takes several months for complete and correct 
information on a transplant to be entered into and verified in the UNOS databases.  Hence, data for a 
specific year are often not considered ‘complete’ until many months later. 
7     Each donor will generate a different ranked list due to differences among individuals. 
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Figure 1. Overview of Organ Procurement, Placement, and Transplantation Process 
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people from the waiting list died per day because an organ was not available.  Currently, the 
number is even larger, with an average of almost 20 people per day dying before they can 
receive a transplant.  The number of cadaveric donors has not grown significantly since 1988 
(when UNOS began tracking organ transplants).  Reasons for the limited supply include 
improvements in medical treatment for traffic-accident, knife-wound, and gun-shot victims; the 
increase in transmittable disease (e.g., HIV/AIDS, hepatitis, etc.) among the general, and 
especially the younger, population; medical personnel neglecting to seek permission for procuring 
organs from the recently-deceased’s family; and a reluctance to donate organs for personal 
and/or religious reasons.8  The percentage of discarded organs (i.e., those that are not used) 
increased between 1988 and 1995 to as much as 9 percent.  Given the limited supply and 
increase in the number of discards, it was desirable that every available organ from the existing 
donor pool be effectively “utilized.”   
Utilization is defined as maximizing the number of organs available per donor and minimizing 
discard rates.  Multiple organ donation (i.e., procuring two or more organs from the same donor) 
increased steadily over the years, with 81 percent of donors in 1993 involving multiple organs.  
Unfortunately, discard rates also increased.  Removing multiple organs increases the time 
between death, placement of the available organs, and their removal and transplantation.  The 
need for a larger donor pool led to the use of organs from individuals from a broader range of 
ages, especially older donors.  Organs from older donors are typically more difficult to place, 
leading to prolonged ischemia.9 Using organs from older donors is one of the contributing factors 
to the increasing discard rate [UNOS, 1997].  All of these delays may result in delayed graft 
function for kidneys and primary non-function for hearts, livers, and lungs when transplanted, or 
to organ discards.  Thus, a reduction in time to place and transplant a donor’s organs can lead to 
a reduction in organ wastage. 10 
III. XPEDITE 
SYSTEM APPROVAL AND DESIGN CRITERIA 
From 1991 to 1995, UNOS studied ways to streamline transplant data collection and data 
transmission using on-line computer technology.  While several areas in the process were 
identified for enhancement and development, the most critical domain identified was that of organ 
placement:  accessing a list of potential organ recipients for a given donor’s organs, contacting 
the transplant centers where the patients are registered, and conveying donor information to 
those centers to speed the decision process [Klein et al, 1994].  This portion of the transplant 
process is indicated in Figure 1.  For example, in 1993, placement time averaged 3.4 hours per 
organ (range 0.5 to 37 hours) for the organs processed through the UNOS system [UNOS 
Handout, 1996].  When multiple organs are being placed, the cumulative placement time required 
to place all of a donor’s organs can easily stretch beyond 24 hours.  This realization was the 
genesis for the creation of Xpedite. 
                                                     
8   Some recent advances in medical knowledge and technology has broadened the pool of  available 
organs through living donor grafts and transplants for some organs (e.g., livers and kidneys) in the very 
late 1990s.   
9      Ischemia is a prolonged period without a blood supply.  Too long a period of ischemia will result in a 
reduction in organ viability. 
10    An additional source for some organs is from living donors.  These are generous people who are willing 
to donate all of an organ (e.g., kidney) or portion of an organ (e.g., liver, lung).  They may or may not be 
biologically related to the recipient.  The number of living donors  increased steadily and now accounts 
for approximately 25 percent of the total number of transplants performed each year (Table 1).  
Because the placement of these organs is not as time critical as it is for cadaveric organs, Xpedite was 
not developed to support this portion of the organ placement domain. 
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In 1994, UNOS received approval from its Board of Directors to begin developing a computer-
based organ information system, later named Xpedite, to collect, process, and disseminate 
essential donor information.  Three state-of-the-art concepts drove Xpedite’s development.   
1. It was realized that the support of organ procurement and placement heavily 
resembled sales force automation.  This insight was used as a guiding conceptual 
framework for system functionality and flexibility.   
2. The outcome was to be a client-server environment providing the procurement and 
transplant centers autonomy in transferring, manipulating, and using the available 
information with centralized database support by UNOS.   
3. Given the limited resources, the need for a high-quality and high-reliability software 
environment, and the speed required for development and activation, a Rapid Application 
Development (RAD) methodology was used. 
SALES FORCE AUTOMATION 
The conceptual framework for Xpedite was based on the existing and then relatively new 
paradigm of sales force automation.  In sales force automation, the sales force is often outfitted 
with laptop computers, hand-held PCs, and even pen-based computers [O’Brien, 1996].  This 
approach improves the individual productivity of the sales people, and can significantly enhance 
the capture, recording, merging, and analysis of relevant sales data for use by corporate 
marketing and other organizational decision makers.  In turn, the marketing area can then support 
the sales people better.  Ultimately, this increased and improved coordination among sales and 
marketing can yield improvements in organizational productivity and responsiveness.   
For organ procurement and placement, the goal is the quick and accurate capture of relevant 
data, transmission of that data to the appropriate decision makers (i.e., the transplant teams), 
more rapid decision making in placing an organ, and better coordination of communication among 
the various constituencies.  Enough potential parallels existed between the two notions to warrant 
investigation of the idea as a conceptual model on which to build the system to support organ 
procurement and placement. 
CLIENT-SERVER ENVIRONMENT 
Throughout the early 1990s, client/server computing was touted as the model for enterprise-wide 
computing for the 21st Century [Beyer, Newell, and Hurst, 1994; Guimares and Igbaria, 1997; 
O’Brien, 1996].  Client/server computing is an information architecture consisting of an integration 
of computer hardware, software, and people, where computing power and information are 
distributed across an interconnected network of computers.  The client, i.e., the user workstation 
or personal computer, is able to perform most of the information processing tasks locally.  These 
tasks include data entry and update, database inquiry, transaction processing, report generation, 
and other interface and decision support activities.  Network servers manage network operations 
and overhead, collaboration and communication within and among workgroups, and the sharing 
of application programs and data throughout the network.  Client/server computing is directed at 
allowing the large, centralized server computers to concentrate on those tasks for which they are 
best suited, such as network communications, high-volume transactions, network security and 
control, and database management and maintenance.  Client machine and user activities can, 
therefore, be more responsive to and focused on their own local application effectiveness and 
efficiency.   
For organ procurement and placement, this type of independent, yet integrated, network of 
computers was perceived as the appropriate framework for design.  The clients are the desktop 
and laptop computers used by the procurement officers and transplant teams; the server is the 
main computer system at UNOS headquarters that contains the OPTN database.  The client 
machines are used by the organ procurement coordinators to enter the donor-relevant data and 
transmit it to UNOS.  The Match system database identifies potential recipients for each organ 
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available.  These lists are sent back to the organ procurement coordinators, who then begin the 
process of notifying the transplant centers of potential recipients of the availability of one or more 
organs for transplant.  The transplant centers can then access the relevant data via the UNOS 
server and make a decision on whether to accept the organ for transplantation.  Coordination can 
then proceed between the various medical centers for organ removal, transportation, and 
transplantation. 
RAPID APPLICATION DEVELOPMENT (RAD) 
Rapid Application Development (RAD) is a software application development methodology first 
elaborated by Martin [1991].  The goal of this methodology is to “use people and automation to 
achieve higher quality applications than those built with traditional lifecycle” approaches (p. vii).  
RAD’s goals are high quality, lower cost, and more rapid system development than more typical 
approaches.  These goals are accomplished by using CASE-based toolset(s), rapidly evolving 
prototypes, and significant user involvement in the design and development process.  In a 
competitive business environment, speed (e.g., to manufacture a product, fill an order, provide an 
answer, construct an application) is increasingly important as organizations look for ways to 
outperform the competition.   
For organ transplantation, speed is of the essence in placing organs to avoid organ wastage and 
to possibly save a life through a successful organ transplant.  The development of a more 
functional information technology-based system to support organ placement needed to be 
accomplished in a short time frame and correctly aligned with the needs of the transplant 
community [Bruno, 1998]. 
PRELIMINARY SYSTEM DESIGN AND TRIAL(S)                                  
Initial approval to investigate and build the system was provided by the UNOS Board of Directors 
in 1994.  This board is made up of representatives from throughout the transplant community, 
including physicians, nurses and other medical staff, organ procurement representatives, and 
both transplant recipients and family members of transplant recipients.  The initial idea and most 
of the development effort was concentrated within the IT area at UNOS.  At the start of the 
project, the development team decided that a prototype would be built using Rapid Application 
Development (RAD) methodologies to get quick feedback on the viability of the concept.   
Because of the nature of the task and the uncertainty about its usefulness in the organ 
procurement environment, many ideas needed to be demonstrated and tested along the way.  
The RAD approach would facilitate this low-risk experimentation of system features and design.  
For example, during the prototype phase, donor information captured and sent to UNOS was 
used to actually place organs.  The original idea was to build a pen-based application using 
wireless communications to collect donor information in the field.  The data would be collected via 
laptop, sent back to UNOS, and distributed to the transplant centers.   
Six pilot sites from across the U.S. were selected for this trial.  During the initial trial, coordinators 
at six organ procurement organizations (OPOs) affiliated with the donor hospitals used portable 
computers to enter pertinent donor data electronically using a common data format.  This process 
eliminated the use of handwritten donor sharing forms. The results determined that legibility was 
greatly improved, the forms generated were more complete, and the time required to enter donor 
data was comparable to the written method.  This trial verified that organ placement could be 
enhanced through this technology by reducing initial data collection errors, transmitting a more 
complete set of donor data to support better decisions, while equaling or reducing (i.e., improving) 
the decision time frame. Each of these enhancements was important in improving the 
procurement and speeding the organ placement process. 
The preliminary study also revealed several important facts that changed the direction of the 
effort.   
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1. Electronic data collection was important, but communication between the donor site 
and the transplant centers was vital.  Both fax and electronic document capability were 
necessary.  Paging was sometimes required to get someone’s attention to act on the 
required decision.  While it was originally felt that wireless communication was an 
important consideration and goal, many donors come from remote areas where wireless 
communication was difficult or impossible in the mid-1990s; therefore, the wireless 
approach was dropped from the agenda.   
2. Organ procurement coordinators wanted the system to integrate with the UNOS 
computer Match system.  Integration would enhance the organ placement process by 
providing greater autonomy such as giving end-user computing capabilities to the 
placement coordinators.   
3. The system was required to work across various technology platforms, such as UNIX, 
Macintosh, and IBM-compatible personal computers, to preserve the existing technology 
investment among the various procurement and transplant centers.   
4. Instead of the anticipated pen-based approach, users actually preferred the keyboard 
for data entry.   
5. These goals had to be met with the two principal constraints: the system needed to be 
developed quickly and cheaply. 
To meet these requirements, UNOS needed technologies that could satisfy the infrastructural 
aspects of linking devices and people along with a rich applications environment. The desire was 
to use off-the-shelf ideas and solutions where possible.  Custom programming was limited to the 
interfaces.  Based on this trial, a subsequent project to integrate the IT infrastructure across all 
phases of organ procurement and placement was initiated.  This meant integrating the already-
existing Match system and the Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients with the new 
components that would automate the collection of donor data, the distribution of match results, 
and the communication and coordination among the transplant centers.  In other words, aligning 
the enhanced system with the strategic efforts of the organization became a paramount goal.  
The original name for the project was already copyrighted, so Xpedite was chosen. 
The prototype for Xpedite was developed in Visual Basic using the RAD methodology. Its user 
interface was elegant but its communication capabilities were slow.  Since improved and more 
rapid communication was one of the primary justifications for Xpedite, another approach was 
used.  Lotus Notes, with capabilities such as data replication, faxing, paging, e-mail, on-line 
collaboration, and possible Internet connections, was selected as the software environment for 
supporting the system.  Notes could meet both planned and potential future communication 
needs.  In addition, Notes was compatible with multiple platforms.  
FINAL DESIGN, CONFIGURATION, AND IMPLEMENTATION 
Xpedite became fully operational at UNOS headquarters and a number of organ procurement 
sites across the country in the fall of 1995.  Its performance exceeded the goals defined at the 
start of the project.  It took advantage of the Notes platform to replicate donor information from 
the field to UNOS and improved communication and coordination among the various participants.  
Although the goal was to use as much off-the-shelf software as possible, in the end much of the 
system required customization to meet performance and quality criteria for organ placement.  In 
addition, although it was to be platform transparent, only IBM-compatible interfaces were 
implemented fully.  Extending Xpedite to other platforms was a long-term goal, but looked to be 
time-consuming and expensive. 
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Figure 2.  Sample Xpedite Screen with Lotus Notes Interface 
With the revised design, the organ procurement coordinators collected donor data using portable 
computers (pen optional) and replicated this information back to the UNOS Notes server. The 
server interfaced with the computer Match system and transmitted the results of the match back 
to the coordinators.  The coordinators could then contact the often geographically dispersed 
transplant centers via the SkyTel paging system to let them know that a particular organ was 
available and that their potential transplant recipient is ranked high on the match list.  For 
example, it could say “a kidney is available for patient x” and that “patient x is ranked second on 
the match run.”  The transplant center for the potential recipient could dial into the UNOS Notes 
server to replicate all information about the donor or use Phone Notes to request a fax of the 
donor information through a fax gateway.  This process was designed to occur simultaneously at 
multiple transplant centers for all organs being placed instead of sequentially as it was historically 
accomplished.  Without this new technology infrastructure, simultaneous transmission of data on 
various organs would be impossible.   
In addition, much of the same on-line donor information could be captured from Xpedite and 
entered directly into the Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients database, reducing the 
amount of time and effort previously required for manual data entry.  Productivity was enhanced 
for UNOS staff and organ procurement coordinators in the field.  It was believed that this 
approach might increase the number of usable organs that could be recovered from a given 
donor due to timely and more widespread transmission of organ offers.  The result was a more 
efficient management of the organ placement process, improved organ utilization, and decreased 
donor hospital time and costs.  These goals were achieved in the limited implementation of the 
system. 
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SYSTEM BENEFITS 
Several benefits resulted from the introduction and use of Xpedite.  The obvious benefit was the 
reduction in time required to place available organs for transplantation.11  Once an individual is 
pronounced dead they are assessed as to whether they may be viable organ donors.  If 
determined to be a candidate for organ donation, permission is sought from the immediate family 
to acquire the organ(s).12  Prior to organ recovery, donors are maintained (i.e., circulation and 
respiration are artificially supported) in expensive critical care facilities.  The donor must be kept 
“alive” while the organs available for transplant are matched with potential recipients. 
Once all organs are matched to a recipient (within certain time constraints), the organ(s) may be 
removed from the donor for transport to the transplant facility.  Sequencing and coordinating 
organ removal is also necessary, meaning that all organs that are to be transplanted must be 
placed with a recipient prior to the organ removal process beginning, i.e., specific recipients for all 
organs must be identified and have accepted the organ for transplant prior to the start of organ 
removal from the donor.  The medical costs incurred during the placement process affect 
everyone through higher insurance rates and increased Medicare/Medicaid costs.  Xpedite 
reduced the time donors spent in these expensive facilities, translating into lower medical costs.  
Finally, donor families, who altruistically consented to donate their loved one’s organ(s), often 
must wait hours until organs are placed and recovered13 before the body can be released for 
funeral arrangements.  Xpedite sped the placement process, which spared the family a lengthy 
and agonizing wait.  This more rapid placement significantly reduced the number of viable organs 
that went unused.   
In addition to saving human life, other significant medical/technical, financial, and humane 
benefits occurred in conjunction with Xpedite’s installation and propagation.  The job of the organ 
procurement coordinator requires intense, focused effort to place organs rapidly and successfully 
from an available donor.  Xpedite simplified the job of the organ procurement coordinator by 
automating much of the placement process in a client/server environment.  While data must still 
be entered into the system, laptop computers can simplify and support this process.  Xpedite then 
transfers the donor data to UNOS, where it is automatically disseminated to the appropriate 
transplant centers based upon the match with potential recipients ranked by the relevant criteria.  
Unlike the old manual process, with Xpedite the coordinator did not have to worry with the details 
related to distributing the donor data.  As a result, the procurement coordinators could 
concentrate on donor management.  The improved communication of important and necessary 
data resulted in higher productivity and a reduction in stress for the coordinators. 
The ultimate goal for Xpedite was to link the entire transplant community electronically using 
Lotus Notes as the basis for communications.  This would include the transmission of organ 
donor-specific information, as well as real-time communication among organ procurement 
coordinators and medical personnel.  A significant part of this growth and evolution was to 
develop an electronic data interchange system that would collect and exchange scientific data on 
transplant recipients.  The ultimate objective was to provide transplant surgeons, physicians, and 
                                                     
11  All improvement data is essentially anecdotal.  Without an experimental and control group for 
comparison, it is impossible to state with certainty that Xpedite is any “better” than the previous 
approach.  However, the general consensus is very positive and the anecdotal evidence supports a 
positive assessment. 
12    Although U.S. law supports acquiring organs from an individual who has a signed donor card without any 
additional consent, the general practice is to also seek permission from surviving family members.  The 
physicians and medical facilities are legally protected, but the additional permission is considered more 
compassionate to the family, avoids misunderstandings, and reduces the likelihood of “frivolous” 
lawsuits. 
 
13 That is, removed from the donor’s body. 
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researchers with an easy method for collecting and sharing scientific data from the Scientific 
Registry on Transplant Recipients.  Communication between all transplant professionals could be 
enhanced through this system.  In addition, e-mail between individuals at different facilities 
facilitated timely professional contact and discussion where little then existed.  Transplant 
professionals could share ideas and collaborate with ease through discussion databases.  
Interaction of this type might improve coordination in better procuring, placing, and monitoring 
transplantation and transplant recipients worldwide.  Notes could link to the Internet, an emerging 
goal for UNOS and the organ transplant community at that time.  Finally, it was envisioned that 
this system could ultimately be extended to link transplant programs globally should the need 
arise.  Xpedite could even serve as a model for other health care groups in developing systems 
for managing and disseminating critical information. 
XPEDITE’S DEMISE 
In spite of its lofty aspirations and the accomplishment of its development and performance goals, 
Xpedite was never widely adopted within the transplant community.  Beyond the six locations 
used during the prototyping and testing phase, no additional sites fully adopted the 
communication technology.  The fax and replication facilities were used sporadically to improve 
the exchange of donor and recipient data, but not enough to justify the continued operation of the 
system.  After just twenty-four months of operation, Xpedite was deactivated on December 15, 
1997.   
Technologically Xpedite stretched the limits of software, hardware, and communications.  It 
required real-time communication and interaction among independent organizations that are 
geographically dispersed.  Collaboration and close teamwork between the interface developers, 
Lotus Corporation, SkyTel, the transplant community, and UNOS staff was essential to the 
development process.  It took the coordination of all concerned to make this project work on time 
and within the limited budget.  The resulting system was a significant achievement in 
collaborative technology and a landmark enhancement in the efficiency and productivity of the 
medical professionals saving lives through organ transplantation.   
The next section considers and discusses additional factors that may have contributed to 
Xpedite’s limited success. 
IV. WHEN SUCCESS RESULTS IN FAILURE 
It is far too common for an information system project to be unsuccessful [cf. Standish Group, 
1994].  The failures are caused by a variety of factors, including a failure to achieve operational 
goals.   However, it is less common for a system to have a goal that all can support, have top 
management backing for development, successfully achieve operational goals, and still not be 
successful due to limited adoption.  In this circumstance, the causes of the failure are less certain.  
While it might be easy to attribute Xpedite’s limited success primarily to technological complexity 
and general resistance to change, the situation deserves some deeper scrutiny and analysis.  
Following the proposition of Hogarth [1991], what is suggested here is that several familiar, yet 
often independently considered factors, contributed to this failure.  In isolation they may not 
capture the richness and complexity of the environment.  They embody many of the subtle 
challenges facing organizations in the increasingly integrated and electronically connected 
environment.  These challenges are now explored in some detail. 
GENERAL OBSTACLES TO CHANGE 
This project faced and endured many obstacles common to the development of an innovative 
idea or technology.  Initially it was necessary to convince the users (i.e., UNOS and the 
medical/transplant profession) that the concept of an integrated, client-server-based information 
system, which only existed on paper, was a worthwhile endeavor given limited resources.  The 
first step is always the toughest, because it requires an act of faith.  Once initial approval was 
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granted for developing Xpedite, it took almost a year before funds were available to construct a 
prototype. 
Following the success of the prototype, and the lessons learned from it, the decision to develop a 
production version required a more intense round of justification that ultimately resulted in 
approval and financial support from the UNOS Board of Directors.  The dual goals of improved 
communication and the reduction of organ wastage through better coordination were easy to 
justify and were widely supported throughout the transplant community.  The challenge was to 
develop an approach that could accomplish these two broad goals.  Because this was a new 
approach, it was necessary to build understanding and support for this effort continually with the 
Board of Directors and throughout the transplant community.  Based on extensive feedback 
received from the transplant community, UNOS thought these efforts were successful. 
What was not completely recognized was that the transplant community was largely unfamiliar 
with an information technology-supported communication environment.  In other words, they were 
not familiar with the technology, particularly Lotus Notes.  While it may be somewhat difficult to 
recall, in the early-to-mid 1990s the number of people with access even to e-mail was still 
relatively small.  The limited experience with technology, especially one that was being 
increasingly integrated throughout the transplant process, may have created some discomfort 
with the technology leading to some reluctance or resistance to adopt and use it for job-critical 
tasks.  Furthermore, the technology itself was somewhat limited.  Even with the substantial 
advances in portability, laptop computers were still often less powerful than needed for some 
application environments.  The more powerful machines were often cumbersome to handle 
physically, especially in already-cramped hospital environments like an operating room and 
intensive care facilities.  Additional features, such as pen-based computing, were still in their 
operational infancy. 
In addition, shortly after Xpedite’s launch, some turnover among the technical personnel and 
system champions began to occur at UNOS.  Although qualified people remained with the 
organization and new hires were quickly placed, some momentum may have been lost as people 
moved into their new roles of support and product champion.  As noted by Beath [1991], 
technology champions are often the most important single factor in the successful implementation 
of an information system.  These champions are often transformational leaders [Burns, 1978] who 
are able to transcend hierarchy to steer the organization through a change process.  It is likely 
that some prestige and status was lost since the new people, many of whom made lateral moves 
within the UNOS organization, were probably not as well known and, therefore, not as highly 
regarded by the Board of Directors and the larger transplant community.  
Xpedite went through a typical adoption cycle, with supporters and detractors.  Most agreed that 
better communications among the procurement coordinators and the transplant centers would 
benefit the organ placement and transplantation process.  Early adopters of the system greatly 
appreciated the system.  Others, some of whom may be described as technology-averse 
Luddites, did not want information technology intervention or support; i.e., the organ procurement 
and placement processes already functioned rather well.  Some physicians were vocal 
supporters; others were not.  For example, as Xpedite was more fully implemented, it was felt that 
the one-hour window for a transplant center to respond to a coordinator about an available organ 
could be reduced radically, thereby speeding the placement process.  However, this potential 
change in policy would remove some of the control from the physicians, threatening their 
autonomy.  As suggested in the job design literature [cf. Hackman and Oldham, 1980], autonomy 
is  
“the degree to which the job provides substantial freedom, independence, and 
discretion to the individual in scheduling work and in determining procedures to 
be used in carrying it out” [Hackman and Oldham, 1976, p. 257].   
Further, research results show that physicians may be reluctant to react positively to information 
technology that interferes with or alters their traditional routines and medical practice [Anderson, 
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1997; Andersen and Aydin, 1997; Chau and Hu, 2002; Zetka, 2003].  Therefore, physicians may 
have been disinclined to adopt the new technology since they had little to directly gain from its 
implementation.  Issues related to autonomy and control are also associated with the concept of 
power, which is discussed later in this section. 
TECHNOLOGY EVOLUTION 
Xpedite’s design was the ambitious and complex melding of several independent technologies, 
specifically Lotus Notes, facsimile machines, and paging, with the already-existing IT 
infrastructure at UNOS.  Further, the software in the IT infrastructure consisted largely of stand-
alone programs.  All were reliable technologies, yet they were maturing at different rates, and 
were not integrated, providing some potential instability for the organ procurement environment.  
For example, in 1995, IBM announced the acquisition of Lotus Development Corporation, the 
parent company of Lotus Notes.  Notes was already a well-regarded and versatile communication 
environment.  While IBM indicated that they would continue to support Notes, there were early 
signals that led to some uncertainty about which parts of the Notes environment would continue 
to be supported, which features would continue to be developed or extended, and how the 
technology support and fee structure environment would evolve under the new corporate parent.  
This uncertainty, and the lack of integration with the three communication technologies, made the 
environment more difficult to support and maintain. 
These issues raised enough uncertainty about the long-term viability and stability of the Notes 
environment that consideration of an alternative approach was revisited.  Recall that the 
procurement and placement process is a round-the-clock activity [Bruno, 1998].  Any disruption in 
the technology support infrastructure could cripple the process and might cost some people their 
chance at a longer, healthier, more productive life.  Fundamentally, the system was technically 
very advanced in trying to coordinate the capture and exchange of information through Lotus 
Notes, facsimile, and pagers.  Unfortunately, its leading edge technical superiority left the system 
difficult to support and maintain, ultimately making it untenable to continue, given the low 
adoption rate.  But additional subtle reasons remain for the low adoption rate for Xpedite. 
ORGANIZATIONAL COUPLING 
UNOS and the transplant community are not a single organization.  Instead, the transplant 
community is a group or network of mostly autonomous organizations that interact during the 
transplantation process.  In the mid-1990s, the transplant community was a network of over 400 
separate organizations, including UNOS, the organ procurement organizations, and the multitude 
of transplant programs around the United States.  UNOS acts as a central point of coordination 
and communication in maintaining the list of potential recipients and the Scientific Registry of 
Transplant Recipients that listed who had received one or more transplants).  However, although 
it monitors transplant-related activities to ensure compliance with transplant community 
guidelines, UNOS has little to no authority to control the actions and operations of other 
organizations within the transplant community other than through the coordination policies and 
procedures in place.   
Thompson [1967] illustrated a conceptual scheme to describe the interdependencies among parts 
of an organization.  These interdependencies, or the type of coupling, represent how work “flows” 
through the organization.  “Pooled” coupling is where the various parts of the organization share 
resources, but are largely independent of one another.  This state can also be characterized as 
loose coupling and is the lowest level of interdependency.  In “sequential” coupling the 
organization members work in sequence or a series, where the work of one leads to another, 
then to another, and so on, as in a relay race.  The interdependencies here are increased, i.e., 
tight coupling, for removing one member from the sequence will disrupt or disable the workflow.  
“Reciprocal” coupling is where organizational members receive inputs from and provide outputs 
to each other in a cyclical fashion.  In this form of tight coupling, interdependencies are at their 
highest for a change that alters the flow of work both before and after the disruption.   
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In general, the transplant community might best be described as a loosely coupled network.  The 
members of the transplantation network do not interact unless they are exchanging information 
with one another and one or more organs are subsequently placed for transplant.  Much of the 
research on coupling in organizations is focused on control systems within a defined organization, 
where the “normative structure is only loosely coupled with the behavioral structure” [Scott, 1987, 
p. 81] or on the relationships among work groups or departments.  The benefit of loose coupling 
is that the elements within the system are capable of relatively autonomous [Ashby, 1968; 
Glassman, 1973] and adaptive [Weick, 1976; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978] behaviors or actions.  
Based on the work of Cyert and March [1963], Pfeffer and Salancik [1978] describe an 
organization as “a coalition of groups and interests, each attempting to obtain something from the 
collectivity by interacting with other, and each with its own preferences and objectives” (p. 36).  
Further, these coalitions evolve as new interests require different purposes and domains. 
Yet, the organizations within the transplant community are also tightly coupled, at least at times.  
When a donor organ or multiple organs become(s) available, quick and accurate coordination is 
required to successfully place as many organs as possible with those awaiting a transplant.  This 
coordination converts the loosely coupled environment into a very tightly coupled, sequential 
environment [Thompson, 1967].  On the macro time scale, reciprocal coupling exists as 
organizations contribute organs to and receive organs from the larger network for transplantation.  
Once a transplant is completed, the tightly coupled interdependencies between the different 
agents effectively revert to a loosely coupled environment. 
POWER 
Power, or more specifically a redistribution of power, may have been a contributing factor in the 
limited success of Xpedite.  Emerson [1962] described power as the control over resources 
valued by others, and Berle [1969] notes that power resides in individuals, particularly where 
technical competence is important (Blau, 1955). Markus [1983] suggested that even in healthy 
organizations, resistance could be an important indicator that signals an information system may 
be altering the balance of power.  In addition, Markus [1983] notes that although people and 
subunits within an organization will differ on their active efforts to gain power, it is doubtful that 
they will freely give it up. 
The IT department within UNOS may be described as functioning in a fashion similar to the 
‘technostructure’ delineated by Mintzberg [1979].  In Mintzberg’s view, the technostructure may 
design, plan, change, and train the people in the operating workflow, but they do not do the 
primary work of the organization themselves.  The technostructure affects standardization and 
coordination in operations as suggested in the identification of technology and information 
technology as being a support activity in the value chain of an organization [Porter, 1985; Porter 
and Millar, 1985].  These changes are most effective when they can make the work of others 
effective in fulfilling organizational operations.  However, even if unintended, some may perceive 
this support as a form of control or a reduction in autonomy, even if that is not the intent [Pfeffer, 
1981].   If those affected perceive these behaviors as a form of control or as a reduction in 
autonomy, the users may resist.  The extension of the IT infrastructure, and the resulting 
standardization of the organ procurement and placement process, may have threatened the 
power of the physicians and surgeons by shifting some of the expertise and control away from the 
physicians. 
ORGANIZATIONAL INERTIA 
An additional obstacle may have been the new and unique nature of the system.  Xpedite was the 
first system of its type within the organ transplantation field and even in the larger general medical 
community.  Before its development, organ sharing and placement was essentially the same for 
the more than ten years since the passage of the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) in 1984, 
and these operational processes were built largely on the informal exchange relationships that 
evolved in the earliest years of organ transplantation.  Between the passage of NOTA and 1995, 
Communications of the Association for Information Systems (Volume 16, 2005) 517-538                          533 
Information Systems and Health Care-VII.  When Success Results in Failure: The Challenge of Extending 
the IT Infrastructure to Support Organ Procurement and Transplantation by J. W. Beard, B. Keck, and       
           T.O. Peterson                                                                                                       
the number of transplants more than doubled. The number of interacting organizations increased 
to well over 400.  To succeed in this complex, time-sensitive environment, routines needed to be 
developed [March and Simon, 1958; Pentland and Rueter, 1994].  Organizational change can be 
beneficial when it builds on established routines and competencies, but can be hazardous if 
found to be too disruptive to normal routines [Amburgey, Kelly, and Barnett, 1993; Haveman, 
1992].  Even positive changes can have disruptive consequences as old routines need to be 
discarded or evolve.  Fundamentally, the tendency of an organization, and individuals, is to resist 
change and maintain the status quo. 
It is not clear from the information available, but it appears that the limited familiarity with the 
technology, the potential for significant disruption of normal operations, and the change in power 
structures may have contributed to Xpedite’s lack of adoption. 
V. EPILOG 
While many of the issues identified in this articled remain incompletely resolved, UNOS continued 
to function.  The Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, including Xpedite, was named 
one of the ten most successful computer systems in the federal government between 1987 and 
1997, receiving the Monticello Award [Jones, 1998; Rayner, 1998].  In addition, UNOS was 
nominated in the medicine category for a 1998 Computerworld Smithsonian Award for the 
advanced and innovative use of IT [Rayner, 1998). 
Xpedite’s operations were terminated on December 15, 1997.  However, almost all of the features 
implemented in or envisioned for Xpedite are now incorporated in the Internet-based successors.  
UNOS early on recognized the potential of the Internet for providing information, creating its first 
web site in 1995.  However, like many organizations, recognition of the greater opportunity to 
leverage the capabilities of the Internet came a bit more slowly.  As attention shifted away from 
Xpedite the realization grew that migration to the Internet offered the chance to develop an 
improved platform to support organ procurement and placement.  By moving to the Internet, 
UNOS found an environment for system development that was less expensive to maintain, 
relatively easy to upgrade or enhance the software, and both reliable and robust enough to 
support the 24/7/365 operational demands of the transplant community. 
TRANSITION TO THE INTERNET 
Migration to the Internet for organ donor and recipient data collection and matching solved 
several of the challenges faced with Xpedite.   
1. The Internet is largely platform independent, especially after Netscape Navigator and 
Microsoft’s Internet Explorer browsers were developed.   
2. The open, largely nonproprietary, protocol-based architecture of the Internet made it much 
easier to design, develop, and maintain the software necessary to perform UNOS’ functions.  As 
a result, no new hardware or software was required to interface with UNOS’ Match system.   
3. The browsers were relatively easy to use, overcoming at least some of the resistance or 
reluctance to use the technology. In addition, physicians and other medical personnel were 
becoming increasingly familiar with IT and more aware of and comfortable with how it could 
support their medical work.   
4. The basic concept of the Internet as a loosely coupled network of interconnected computers 
may be compatible with the tacit mental model of the users.   
5. The transplant community was becoming increasingly familiar with IT support through their 
exposure to Xpedite.  The looming Internet boom of the late 1990s also pulled many late adopters 
into the Internet environment.  The Internet itself, being a network of interconnected computers, 
provided a reliable and robust infrastructure for consistent, stable communication throughout the 
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transplant community.  Organizations within the transplantation system still were required to 
connect to the Internet, either through a dial-up phone line or by becoming a more permanent 
node on the network.  In general, connectivity was relatively easy and inexpensive.   
Some of the organizational issues continue to evolve.  The cadaveric donor base did not grown 
much in the 20 years since the passage of NOTA, although medical technology allowed an 
increase in the use of living donors to fill at least part of this growing deficit [UNOS, 2001].  
Unfortunately, the demand for transplants continued to grow, with over 92,000 currently on the 
waiting list [UNOS, 2004]. 
Xpedite, and its successors UNET and TIEDI (the Transplant Information Electronic Data 
Interchange) helped reduce some organ wastage and improved the capture and communication 
of donor and recipient data.  Both were designed with the input of advisory committees made up 
of system users.  UNET is a private, password-protected secure Internet site that integrates the 
patient waiting list, organ match runs and placement, and transplant data capture.  TIEDI, one of 
the component pieces of UNET, uses the concept of electronic data interchange (EDI) as a 
guiding framework.  It is a more user-friendly interface for the capture of donor and recipient data.  
It provides better links for matches to the Waiting List and greater accuracy for transplant data 
transfer to the Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients. 
Recall that in addition to the actual match and transplant, this data ultimately is placed in the 
Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients.  Mining this data allowed the transplantation 
scientists to broaden the parameters (e.g., age) of acceptable donors, thereby enlarging the pool 
of available organs somewhat.  New advances in medical science also made it possible for living 
donors to contribute kidneys and grafts of partial livers and lungs for transplantation [UNOS, 
2004].  Constant mining and analysis of the data also led to new policies and criteria for allocation 
and placement of some needed organs where the wait time for transplantation was excessive for 
some people [cf. Johannes, 2004; Koch, 1999; Pritsker, 1998].  These new policies continued to 
try to balance donor availability with the demands of potential recipients and transplant facility 
capabilities and needs.   
V. CONCLUSION 
Organ transplantation is still a relatively young domain of medical practice.  The entire domain — 
from organ procurement and placement, to donor-recipient matching, to patient maintenance 
following transplantation — requires constant observation and assessment for ways to improve 
and refine the transplantation process.  Xpedite was developed using the RAD methodology to 
facilitate rapid, low-cost development of a high-quality system to improve organ placement and to 
better integrate the IT infrastructure.  It was a client/server environment designed to resemble the 
operations and functionality of sales force automation.  Xpedite leveraged human capability by 
improving communication of data and coordination of the procurement process through the use of 
information technology, allowing the organ procurement coordinator to concentrate on donor 
management.  This required extensive human interaction (among donor family members and 
medical personnel), while the system handled communications and dissemination of donor 
information. 
However, for a variety of technical and organizational issues, Xpedite never completely achieved 
the goals set for it.  Operations for Xpedite were terminated only 24 months after activation.  
Although performance goals were achieved, it was technically too complex and expensive to 
maintain, especially given the low adoption rate in the transplant community.  As Xpedite was 
terminated, a better approach in terms of cost, support, and user accessibility was found to be 
available through the Internet, and that transition was implemented rapidly.  
Challenges from the transplant community were encountered and addressed.  Xpedite may have 
challenged the status quo in the decision making process, creating some resistance to its 
implementation.  In addition, it was not implemented across all relevant operating platforms, 
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meaning that some organizations would be required to transition or upgrade to the platform 
supported from their existing hardware and software systems.  These conflicts were ultimately 
resolved as UNOS migrated to an Internet-based environment.   
UNOS learned from the experience that they may be the technical core of the diverse transplant 
community, but that the community members’ needs are not uniform.  The transplant community 
looks to UNOS for a consistent, reliable infrastructure to support transplantation operations, but 
may resist other perceived changes.  In an era when organizations are increasingly 
interconnected, technology is increasingly embedded in both internal and inter-organizational 
operations, and organizational goals among related organizations may not always be in 
congruence, the concepts presented in this paper raise provocative questions that require further 
investigation. 
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